The income protection, therefore, must be 
The effect of the farmer's choice of crop incompared to the increase in cost. surance was evaluated on both the farmer's Thus, both farmers and lenders need to consurancen s eval ed oth e s sider the risk/return situation relative to crop and lender's performance. This was done usinsurance. At times, however, riskretu ing whole-farm, Monte Carlo simulation for preernce. At time, between farmers and Texas wheat/sorghum operations. Results inpreferences may differ between farmers and dicate crop insurance would be preferred by lenders. In this study, we investigate the crop dicate crop insurance would be preferred by insurance question and the conditions unde moderately risk-averse farmers when farm insurance question and the conditions under moderately risk-averse farmers when farm which both lenders and farmers would prefer firm failure became an issue or the insurance loss ratio approached one. A lender always crop insurance. preferred the use of crop insurance, especially
Prior studies (Gardner and Kramer; King when the probability of firm bankruptcy was and ee and ogo) have foced on the fa and Lee and Djogo) have focused on the farman issue.
level effects of crop insurance but have not Key words: crop insurance, risk managediscussed effects on the lender. Pflueger and ment, simulation, farmers' perBarry placed lenders in a hypothetical case spective, lenders' perspective. study and found lenders would provide additional credit to farmers using crop insurance.
Many farmers have found farm income in the
The effect of borrowers' use of crop insurance 1980s insufficent to service debt incurred in on lenders income, however, has not been exthe 1970s. The resultant increase in loan delinplored and thus thls is the main question this quencies and problem loans has also stressed study explored explicitly. This analysis allows quencies and problem loans has also stressed determine L instances when it may be agricultural lenders. In this study, we exonetodetermine the instantes whenqit mayrbe amine some of the effects that crop insurance advantageous for lenders to require farmers has in such a setting. ' use Crop insurance can affect the lender's credit defaulted loan payments. Some lenders have risk. From the lender's standpoint, the ultireacted to this by either requiring or considermate risk is the loss associated with a defaulted ing requiring crop insurance of lendees. The loan. The default rate, in turn, is influenced by cost of the insurance premium, however, rea borrower's net income, net income variability, duces a firm's income and liquidity reserves and leverage position. Because crop insurance and can increase the probability of bankruptcy.
affects both expected returns and variability, crop insurance will affect the default rate.
options could not remove the deficit, the farm Some lenders have reacted to this by requirwould be declared insolvent and foreclosure ing crop insurance.
initiated. Lenders may also encourage crop insurance Cumulative net present value (NPV) use by charging farmers who do not use it a distributions for the farmer and lender were higher interest rate. Traditionally, agriculdeveloped under alternative scenarios regardtural lenders have not charged interest rates ing variability and crop insurance purchase. that vary with the riskiness of the borrower.
The NPV distributions were incorporated It is a viable alternative, however, that may within an expected utility framework to deterbe considered. Of course, while an interest mine the level of risk aversion where decision rate premium increases lender income, it also makers were indifferent between farming reduces borrower profitability which, in turn, situtation that used crop insurance and those may decrease liquidity and increase the dethat did not. Comparisons were then drawn fault rate. Lenders, thus, face tradeoffs.
between the preferences of the farm operator Analysis of the insurance problem requires and the farm lender. information on the farm income and probability A farmer's NPV represents the present distributions. Whole-farm simulation was used value of ending farm net worth, plus yearly to generate these distributions under alterfamily withdrawals minus off-farm income disnative yield variabilities using the FLIPSIM counted to the present, minus beginning net model (Richardson and Nixon; Richardson et al.; worth. All cash flows were adjusted for taxes. and Perry et al.) . Briefly, FLIPSIM is a firm-An 8 percent after-tax discount rate was used. level, recursive, simulation model which simu-The lender's NPV was the discounted debt lates the annual production, farm policy, repayment (principal and interest) based on marketing, financial management, growth, operating and term loans provided to the and income tax aspects of a farm over a farming operation, minus the funds loaned to multiple-year planning horizon. The model the farm operator. The lender's cash flows recursively simulates a typical farm by using were not adjusted for taxes. The interest rate the ending financial position for year 1 as the charged on operating loans was used as the beginning position for the second year, and so discount rate for the bank. on. Accounting equations and identities constitute almost all of the computational comFarm Situation ponents of the model. Psuedo-random prices and yields are drawn from a multivariate em-A representative North Texas High Plains pirical probability distribution. A historical wheat/srghum farm was analyzed. Informa correlation matrix was used to capture the tion used to define a representative farm was correlation between the yields and prices. A obtained from 1980 and 1983 surveys. It was six-year period was simulated.
assumed that the representative farm cona periodf assm sim ed trolled 1,400 acres. Six hundred and forty A number of assumptions were made relaacres of cropland were owned and the same tive to the financial function of the firm. Examount leased on a 1/4-share basis. One-half of isting and new long-and intermediate-term the cropland was irrigated and planted equally loans were amortized (using the remaining to wheat and sorghum. The other half was balance formula) based on their respective planted to dryland wheat. The remaining land loan life, initial amount borrowed, and annual was in pasture and leased out at $5 per acre. interest rate. Variable interest rates were
The representative farm had an initial asset used for new and old loans. position valued at $580,150, with $338,200 in Cash flow deficits were allowed to be real estate and the rest in farm machinery. covered several ways, such as: (a) a loan could
The definition of the representative farm was be taken out secured by crops held for sale in consistent with 1980 and 1983 surveys of the next tax year, (b) a mortgage could be obfarmers in the region. tained on equity in farmland and intermediate-
The initial debt-to-asset ratio for the term assets, or (c) farmland could be sold. The representative farm was assumed to be 0.6 operator could borrow up to a prespecified and to be the same for intermediate-and longlevel of debt-to-assets. Cropland sold to meet term assets. The farmer was allowed to sell cash flow deficits could be leased back in cropland to avoid insolvency but was not subsequent years to avoid having more allowed to purchase or lease additional machinery than necessary to farm the remaincropland. It was assumed the farmer received ing acreage. If the combination of all of these $6,000 in off-farm income annually. The 114 minimum and maximum family living expense interviews with lenders, attorneys, and aucwas assumed to be $18,000 and $40,000, tioneers. Based on these interviews, the cost respectively. Marginal consumption was 25 of foreclosure, Cf, was approximated by percent of disposable income over the minimum amount.
(1) Cf = $14,000 + i(t/12)D + 0.4A, The six-year simulation was replicated 50 times over a planning horizon beginning in where the first component, $14,000, is the 1985. It was assumed that the 1985 crop year associated fixed costs (i.e., legal expenses and farm program provisions were in place for an opportunity cost of lenders' time). The second entire planning horizon. The annual mean component is the opportunity cost of nonacprices of wheat and sorghum were assumed to crual outstanding debt. This is calculated by be $3.20 and $4.10 per bushel, respectively. multiplying outstanding debt, D, by the inPer acre mean yield for irrigated wheat, terest rate, i, and the time the foreclosure redryland wheat, and sorghum was assumed to quires. Lenders interviewed indicated that be 60, 18, and 60 bushels, respectively. Probthe mean length of foreclosure, measured in ability distributions of yield and price were months, t, was 4. The third component is the based on historical observations for a farm in reduction in the value of farm asset due to the area. Expenses, inputs, labor requireforeclosure. This is the market value of assets, ments, and other necessary information were A, multiplied by the percent loss in asset obtained from the Texas Agricultural Extenvalue, 0.4, due to foreclosure. sion Service crop enterprise budgets and exBy convention, the loan note would include a tension specialists in the region.
clause which requires the borrower to compensate the lender for costs and expenses inFarm Lender Situation curred by the lender in collecting any past-due The farm lender was not extensively modeled payments. This implies that all costs of in this study. The costs and repayments of foreclosure would be borne by the borrower. loans made to the representative farm, howIn this study, however, we assumed all foreever, were treated in a partial budgeting closure cost in excess of the borrower's ending framework considering this loan only. The equity, E, would be borne by the lender. This probability distribution of returns to loans would occur due to farm bankruptcy or "goodwas estimated using loan payment results will" considerations by the lender. The from the farm simulation.
foreclosure cost to the borrower, Cf,b is, thus, The farm lender was assumed to be the farmer's sole source of borrowed funds other (2) Cf, b = Min (E, Cf), than through CCC loans. This simplification is consistent with current trends and allowed and the foreclosure cost to the lender, Cf 1, is the study to focus on the effects of crop insurance with loan arrangements held constant.
(3) Cf 1 = Max (0, Cf -E). It was assumed that the lender initiated foreclosure whenever the firm could not meet
The costs of foreclosure were included when current debt obligations after exhausting all calculating the NPVs. alternatives of obtaining cash and the farmer's debt-to-asset ratio increased above a SIMULATION RESULTS prespecified level, 0.67. This was consistent with a 1986 survey of major Texas agriculThe resentatie farm ws uaed tural lenders (Leatham) . The farm debt-toa t asset ratio at which lenders considered and assuming that it was not used. When crop asset ratio at which lenders considered iu ce was purchased, the highest yiel folsue rangt 73 per .
insurance was purchased, the highest yield foreclosure ranged from 64 to 73 percent. It medium price option was also assumed in this tudythat repaid protection and the medium price option were was also assumed in this study that repaid princpals aftumer fon reclosue costs rcld b used (i.e., 75 percent of the actual production principal after foreclosure costs could be yield was assumed to be inreinvested at the discount rate. history [APH] yield was assumed to be inreinvested at the discount rate. sured at an insured price of $2.80). This level of insurance was consistent with a study by
Cost of Foreclosure
Lovell et al. They found that the after-tax The total accounting of farm and lender NPV for a representative wheat farm in NPV requires treatment of the costs of Ochiltree County, Texas, was highest when foreclosure. Estimates of foreclosure cost the highest yield protection and the medium components were obtained through telephone price option were chosen. The insurance premium, obtained from the regional field ofratios. In Table 1 , we show that the mean fice, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation NPV was greater and the standard deviation (FCIC) and based on APH yield, was 6.1 per-(SD) of NPV was lower when crop insurance cent ($10.25 per acre) on irrigated wheat and was used at all loss ratios. Only modest dif-18.4 percent ($9.27 per acre) on dryland ferences in the mean, SD, and coefficient of wheat.
variation (CV) of lender's NPV, were observed, The representative farm was also simulated however, when loan default due to farm using alternative insurance loss ratios. The failure was not a factor (Tables 1 and 2 ). base insurance loss ratio was 0.36.1 Loss
The representative farm with an insurance ratios of 0.47, 0.58, 0.70, 0.81, 0.92, and 1.04 loss ratio of 0.36 or 0.47 did not fail, with or were also simulated by parametrically inwithout crop insurance, over the six-year creasing the variability of wheat yields by 10, planning horizon (Table 2) . Thus, loan default 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 percent, respectively.
was not an issue and only minor changes were Results showed, from the lender's perspectobserved in the lender's performance meaive, that farmers' use of crop insurance sures when no crop insurance was used. These dominated not using crop insurance at all loss changes were due to different levels and pat- aLoss ratios are consistent with 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60% increases in wheat yield deviations. bprobability of survival is the probability that the farm will maintain its equity-to-asset ratio at or greater than minimum levels established by local financial institutions.
Net Present Value -------------------of Lender Income
------------------ ------ Crop Insurance ----- ------- No Crop Insurance -------
TABLE 2. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR FARMERS UNDER INSURANCE ALTERNATIVES AND SELECTED LEVELS OF INSURANCE LOSS RATIOS

Net Present Value --------------------of Farmer Income --------------------------Crop Insurance---------------No Crop Insurance ----------
CThe strategy of farmers' nonuse of crop insurance dominated using crop insurance for all levels of farmers' risk aversion.
dThe strategy of farmers' use of crop insurance dominated not using crop insurance for all levels of farmers' risk aversion.
terns of borrowing under the stochastic Given the breakeven k value and the a pertisimulation (Table 1) .2 nent to the alternative allows Z to be calcuThe probability of foreclosure was nonzero lated. In turn, the probability of that Z value at insurance loss ratios of 0.58 and above was looked up in the standard normal table. A (Table 2) . When crop insurance was not used Pratt risk-aversion coefficient of 0.0000052 (loss ratio = 0.58), the lender's average NPV was required for the farm operator to be indifdecreased by $340 (Table 1 ). The SD of the ferent between purchasing crop insurance or lender's NPV and CV of NPV increased by not when the loss ratio was 0.58. Given a $930 and 21 percentage points, respectively. $58,500 standard deviation of NPV under the The lender's performance measures worsened above assumptions, the farm operator must as the insurance loss ratio was increased. At discount risky alternatives by 0.124 standard an insurance loss ratio of 1.04, for example, deviations or more (54.8% confidence interval) the lender's NPV decreased by $2,240, and in order to justify not buying crop insurance. the CV increased by 459 percentage points. In This means that the farmer allows the outthese situations, lenders would clearly prefer comes in the 45.2% tail to cause the insurance a borrower's use of crop insurance.
option to be chosen. Results indicate, thus, Simulation results showed that crop in-that farm operators who conform to the farmsurance always decreased the farmer's SD of ing situation with an insurance loss ratio of NPV but its effect on income depended on the 0.58 or larger and are modestly risk averse loss ratio: at low loss ratios income was reduced (discount risky alternatives by 0.124 standard as premium payments exceeded average indeviations or more) will choose crop insurance. surance paybacks ( Table 2 ). The strategy of a A potential conflict in the preference of a farmer's nonuse of crop insurance dominated farmer's choice of crop insurance between a using crop insurance for all levels of farmers' risk-averse farm operator and his lender was risk aversion when the loss ratio was 0.36 or found for the farming situation with an in-0.47. When the loss ratios were at or about surance loss ratio of 0.58 or less. As previously 0.58, however, the farmer's mean NPV noted, the crop insurance alternative domidecreased sharply and the SD and DV increased nated nonuse of crop insurance from the sharply. 3 The crop insurance alternative lender's perspective. Results showed, howdominated the alternative of not using crop inever, that risk-averse farmers would prefer surance whenever the loss ratio was 0.70 or not using crop insurance when insurance loss higher. A farmer's decision of using crop inratios were 0.48 or less and that some would surance depended on his risk/return prefprefer not using it when insurance loss ratios erence when the loss ratio was 0.58.
were 0.58 (Table 2) . Potential conflicts were Assuming constant absolute risk aversion, not found in the other farming situations the Pratt risk-aversion parameter, 4, was modeled. calculated such that decision makers were inThe lender's response of adding a premium different between farming situations that to the interest rate was investigated. The difused crop insurance and those that did not (as ference in a farmer's average NPV and SD of suggested by Hammond or as implemented in NPV between nonuse and use of crop inthe risk root procedure by McCarl). Values of surance decreased and increased, respectively, the Pratt coefficient ( were interpreted probas a result of increases in interest rates abilistically following the arguments of McCarl (Table 3 ). The implied confidence interval reand Bessler and assuming normality. Namely, quired before a farmer would choose crop ingiven a Pratt coefficient of 0 and assuming the surance decreased as the interest rate prerisk premium (1/24a2) is a multiple Z times the mium increased. This implies that fewer standard error implies that Z equals (Oa)/2. farmers would choose the no-insurance alter-native in response to higher interest rate 0.36) and 0.1 percent-0.2 percent (insurance premiums. At one extreme, an interest preloss ratio = 0.47). At the other extreme, the mium of 0.2 percent or less, the strategy of a strategy of a farmer's use of crop insurance farmer's nonuse of crop insurance still dominated not using crop insurance for all dominated using crop insurance for all levels risk-averse farmers when interest premiums of the farmer's risk aversion, given an inwere 0.5 percent, 0.3 percent, and 0.1 percent surance loss ratio of 0.36. The combined effect under conditions of insurance loss ratios of of increased interest payments and increased 0.36, 0.47, and 0.58, respectively. likelihood of failure, on the other hand,
The results showed that crop insurance conresulted in the farmer's preference for crop inflicts between the lender and farmer could be surance except for the less risk-averse and resolved by adding an interest rate premium risk-loving farmers at interest premiums of in response to a farmer's nonuse of crop in-0.3 percent-0.4 percent (insurance loss ratio = surance. Both the farmer and the lender pre- aprobability of survival is the probability that the farm will maintain its equity-to-asset ratio at or greater than minimum levels established by local financial institutions.
bLoss ratios 0.36, 0.47, and 0.58 are consistent with 0%, 10%, and 20% increases in wheat yield deviations.
dThe strategy of farmers' use of crop insurance dominated not using crop insurance for all levels of farmers' risk aversion. bThe strategy of farmers' nonuse of crop insurance dominated using crop insurance for all levels of lenders' risk aversion.
ferred that the farmer did not use crop inare not risk averse may choose to pay the surance when the insurance loss ratio was 0.36 premium to avoid purchasing crop insurance. and the interest rate premium was less than
Results showed that adding a premium to in-0.2 (Tables 3 and 4) . Under these conditions terest rates increased the lender's average the interest premium was sufficiently high to NPV when farmers chose nonuse of crop inmake the loan attractive to the lender but not surance; however, the SD of NPV also increased so high that the likelihood of farm failure in- (Table 5 ). The lender's strategy of charging an creased or discouraged farmers from choosing interest rate premium of 0.2 percent or less the no-insurance option. The conflict was also was preferred to the nonresponse strategy resolved by lenders charging an interest rate when farmers opted to not use crop insurance premium sufficient to encourage all risk-(insurance loss ratio = 0.36). This was true for averse farmers to buy crop insurance: 0.5 perall levels of lender's risk aversion. For other cent (insurance loss ratio = 0.36). 0.3 percent levels of interest rate premiums and insurance (insurance loss ratio = 0.47), and 0.1 percent loss ratios, results showed that the lender's (insurance loss ratio = 0.58). response would depend on the level of lender's Potential conflict still existed when the risk aversion in situations where the lender interest rate premiums were 0.3 percentwas sure that crop insurance would not be 0.4 percent (insurance loss ratio = 0.36) and used even if an interest rate premium was 0.1 percent-0.2 percent (insurance loss ratio = charged. 0.47). The increase in profits from interest
We conclude from these results that in this payments was dampened somewhat by the incase lenders should encourage their borcreased likelihood of loan default. Under these rowers to buy crop insurance by adding a conditions the lender's preference for premium to the interest rate charged to borfarmer's use of crop insurance was dependent rowers who choose nonuse of crop insurance. on lender's level of risk aversion. A highly risk
The premium amount would depend on the averse lender may prefer that the farmer use lender's risk-aversion level. Only the less riskcrop insurance but a farmer that is not very averse lenders, however, should use this risk averse may prefer the option of not using strategy on borrowers who are not likely to crop insurance. Thus the potential conflict reuse crop insurance when an interest premium mained.
is charged. Only in those situations where the Regardless of the interest rate premium a insurance loss ratio was 0.36 would it be lender charges in response to a farmer's preferred by all risk-averse lenders to charge nonuse of crop insurance, some farmers who an interest rate premium of 0.2 percent. aProbability of survival is the probability that the farm will maintain its equity-to-asset ratio at or greater than minimum levels established by local financial institutions. bLoss ratios 0.36, 0.47, and 0.58 are consistent with 0%, 10%, and 20% increases in wheat yield deviations.
CThe lenders' strategy of charging a higher interest rate to uninsured borrowers dominated the nonresponse strategy for all levels of lenders' risk aversion.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
charged by the lender proved to be sufficient In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a incentive t cause risk-averse farmers to farmer's choice of crop insurance on the adopt crop insurance. farmer's and his lender's performance. The results show that crop insurance uniformly There are two implications of this research. decreases farmer income variability but that
First, it appears that the current design of the effect on income level depends on the crop insurance programs favors farmers who variability of yields. In an area situation have higher variability relative to other where the premium depends on average yield farmers in their area. Second, it appears that rather than yield variability, the results show in this case lenders should prefer their clients that increases in variability increase the into use crop insurance, especially whenever centive for farmers to adopt crop insurance.
farm failure is an issue, and that a small inSimultaneously, the results show the lender to terest rate premium is sufficient to cause this always prefer crop insurance. This was shift. If a farmer chooses not to use crop inespecially true when yield variability led to surance for whatever reason, however, a farm failure. This revealed a conflict in that higher average return to the lender would be crop insurance may be preferred by lenders accompanied by an increase in the likelihood but not by farmers. A small risk premium of loan default.
